The Peace of Westphalia: Where Does It Fit Into the General Crisis Theory?

An academic paper submitted at Middlebury College during the 1992-1993 academic year.

It is not disputed among historians that the Treaty of Westphalia was an important event in the history of early modern Europe. What is debated and discussed quite ably by many prominent historians is whether the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was the ending point of a general crisis, or whether, as E.J. Hobsbawm argues, it was a beginning to an era of change that was to last for the remainder of the century.[1] Mr. Hobsbawm argues most strongly that 1648 marked a beginning rather than an end. Mssrs Hobsbawm, Trevor-Roper, Rabb, and Elliott all seem to agree that there was a general crisis at some point between 1500 and 1700.[2] However, with the exception of Mr. Hobsbawm, all of them view the period of the middle of the seventeenth century (during which, of course, the Peace of Westphalia was made) primarily as an end to the time of general crisis.

Mr. Hobsbawm's argument is almost entirely economic; despite all but ignoring most other factors, he does an excellent job of describing the beginning of an economic crisis dating to around the middle of the seventeenth century. He notes the decline of trade in Europe, most notably in Denmark (with the Sound tolls falling to a low before the 1650s and staying depressed for about thirty years[3]) and the Mediterranean (where trade became primarily localized[4]).

He relates also the number of revolts throughout Europe.[5] He notes that many historians have seen this rash of social revolution as a signal of a general crisis, and emphasizes the role of eastern European uprisings in heralding a general crisis, but Mr. Hobsbawm does not leave this as his only evidence; indeed, it is brought in as relevant information adding strength to his economic argument by showing that people were tired of being taxed to pay for the war.[6]

Mr. Hobsbawm notes that previously, the conditions summarized above, and others which are equally relevant but for which there is no space nor call here,[7] have been explained as resulting in various ways from the Thirty Years' War.[8] He points out that this explanation is not always consistent, and his examples are quite true: there was crisis in areas that remained peaceful and success in war-torn regions.[9] It does seem logical, however, that effects of war elsewhere affected places where war was not so that peaceful regions were in similar conditions as the rest of war-plagued Europe. Similarly, war-ravaged areas bordered by peaceful, successful regions must have been buffered by the proximate economic strength and stability.

Where, then, does the Peace of Westphalia figure into this? This was my original question, and now, having described the conditions from Hobsbawm's point of view, I may begin properly to address it. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War, and it has been portrayed as a requisite precursor to other events that came later in the seventeenth century:[10] it created an environment of peace that had been absent from Europe for the previous three decades, allowing for a rebuilding process to begin.

After wars, economies tend to recess from the frenzy of wartime production.[11] The Thirty Years' War did an immense amount of damage (both structurally and economically), especially when taken in terms of the relatively short time in which it took place.[12] It is certainly feasible that widespread recession following the war could cause much of the crisis on its own, and if a general crisis was already beginning, the economic repercussions of the end of the war definitely contributed to it.

Mr. Hobsbawm's descriptions of trends appearing before 1648 can also be at least partially explained by the effects of long-term war in a wide area, one vital to Europe's well-being. Central and eastern Europe have traditionally been the breadbasket of Europe, as well as providing economic stability to the continent.[13] When they were destroyed by war this could only have led to a continent-wide economic decline.

Revolts are also linked to the Treaty of Westphalia. In the treaty was established the policy of cuius regio, eius religio, which was the right of the monarch in a territory to dictate the religion of his subjects.[14] This angered people in states where the monarch was of a religion different from that of his people, and they were prone to revolt, at least initially.[15]

A more long-lasting effect of the Treaty of Westphalia is the creation of a new diplomatic canon. Mr. Rabb points out that the treaty was seen by its writers as an answer to major problems and not a temporary truce.[16] Other, subsequent treaties (those of the Pyrenees, Copenhagen, Olivia, and Utrecht were specifically named by Mr. Rabb), were seen both by historians today and, Mr. Rabb argues, by their framers, as modifiers to Westphalia.[17] Westphalia, when viewed in this context, is certainly the beginning of a period of change in European politics, as well as the economic factors enumerated in Mr. Hobsbawm's article.

Mr. Rabb also notes that popular perspective changed after Westphalia. They had hope for a better future, and were glad that the ordeal of the previous thirty years was over.[18] This was a new feeling for the people of Europe -- that they were in some sort of control over their own destiny and that there was some sort of framework within they would act. It was a sense of order that had certainly not been present during the Thirty Years' War, or, for that matter, since before 1618.[19]

Mr. Trevor-Roper adds that after Westphalia there was a new intellectual atmosphere in Europe: beginning around 1650, "for another century and a half we have another . . . climate, the climate of the Enlightenment."[20] This is a manifestation of the new attitude among Europeans; as new opportunities were seen, scholars began to examine new ways to take advantage of them. This resulted in the new theories of government and social reform seen emerging in the late eighteenth century.[21]

These new ideas on ruling affected diplomacy as well; as rulers saw themselves as independent of each other and saw their reigns as derived from the newfound "truths of humanity,"[22] they behaved differently toward each other than before the Thirty Years' War. Where before the Thirty Years' War (and this change began during the war) religion and religious alliances had been prominent in Europe, after 1648 religion took more of a back seat in defining diplomatic interaction.[23]

This, as well as the initial revolts (as mentioned earlier in this paper) stems from the cuius regio, eius religio clause again; with princes suddenly permitted to exercise their religious freedom within their own states, they were inclined to do so outside their realms as well. Religious bias obviously cannot but destroy international relations under these circumstances; princes were more likely to declare themselves to be the religion they truly believed in, as it no longer mattered to the Holy Roman Emperor, and Protestants had stopped caring about the Pope.[24]

Gone were the days when appearance was everything and Henri IV "converted" to Catholicism to end public outcry that a Protestant was taking the French throne.[25] With the rulers' religions as diverse as they must have been (what with all the small German states in the Holy Roman Empire), considering the religion of an ally or enemy was confusing at best, and completely divisive at worst. All of the smaller German states would have no hope of exercising any international power had they not ignored religion in favor of political expediency.[26 ]

Despite this evidence of the period surrounding Westphalia as a beginning, it is important not to ignore the other side of the coin; that is to say, if Westphalia is seen as a beginning to an era, there must certainly be something ending and giving way to the new, changed world explored above.

Mr. Trevor-Roper states that there was "[f]rom the end of the fifteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth century . . . one climate, the climate of the Renaissance." The focus of Mr. Rabb's book Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe is just this cultural climate. Mr. Hobsbawm also states that until the middle of the seventeenth century, the "taste" of revolution does not become more than an addition to the "medieval or feudal dish" present in Europe.[27] Mr. Rabb begins the "before" period at the year 1500, lasting for a century and a half, until around 1650.[28] There is, then, a consensus among these prominent historians that the period from around 1500 to around 1650 set the stage for the large changes that took place in the middle of the seventeenth century. We shall now explore what ended so that the Peace of Westphalia could begin a new era, keeping in mind that Westphalia somehow serves as a formal closing to the preceding age.

Mr. Trevor-Roper observes, quite correctly, that international warfare was also common, particularly in the final thirty years of the period in question.[29] He goes on, however, to state that the Thirty Years' War was a continuation of the Bourbon-Habsburg wars of the sixteenth century; wars that had ended but with unsatisfactory and inconclusive compromises like the Treaty of Câteau Cambrésis in 1559.[30] Thus previous military and diplomatic (if war can be called such) history had created an environment suitable for war and, subsequently, massive change.

The Peace of 1648 is certainly the end to a destructive thirty years of war. It was the end of the old Habsburg domination of Germany and the surrounding area; the success of the Prussians established the Hohenzollerns as a powerful force in the northern German region.[31] It was an end, Kagan, Ozment, and Turner also point out, to the hegemony of the Ottomans, Swedes, and Poles in eastern and central Europe.[32] There was, then, an air of international instability (importantly, though, a peaceful one) after Westphalia. This was the general political atmosphere, related to but different from other, non-political areas of culture and civilization.

Mr. Trevor-Roper's description of the Renaissance style of Europe in 1500-1650 as creating a need for change is equally important. He writes that there was a great deal of expansion in Europe, in all fields from industry to academia, but that it lacked a key element, which was to surface in the postwar Enlightenment: curiosity. He writes, "they [great writers of the time] adventure, observe, describe, perhaps mock; but they do not analyse, criticize, question."[33] This is in keeping with the sense of group identity that was present in Europe in the sixteenth century. Spain, for example, had a striking sense of unified mission in its exploration and religious endeavors in the New World. Scholars examined this at the time, but no-one dared criticize it.[34]

Mr. Elliott deals primarily with the revolutions of the mid-seventeenth century as they relate to those in the mid-sixteenth century.[35] He complains that the revolutions in the 1500s were "overlooked" as a sort of "general crisis of the sixteenth century."[36] However, the earlier revolutions were not part of a general crisis because they lacked other factors that the seventeenth century possessed (economic decline and general international turmoil are two important ones that surface in the 1600s that did not in the 1500s).[37] But he does raise a vital issue: the revolutions in the sixteenth century were largely failures due to governmental suppression.[38] There was another chance for revolt to induce change a hundred or so years later, and the opportunity was taken.

Again the question arises: where does Westphalia become a part of this? The reply to the first issue, that of questionable diplomacy is that it ends the trend of poor treaties, and, as discussed above, is a strong one that begins a new trend. It seems to resolve the needs of the international diplomatic community in Europe in that the structure of Europe as created at Westphalia is quite clear and agreeable to all parties involved.[39] This ends the period of incapable diplomats writing treaties as stop-gaps between wars, to allow time to recover and fight again.

This was, we can assume (given the unlikely nature of its change otherwise), a mostly deliberate response to a need. This need had not been observed before, because social commentators were not big on questioning. After 1648 the Enlightenment's opportunities for social question and change were new and different; the old pattern of looking closely but not analyzing or modifying had drawn to an end. Westphalia and its success mark the first example of Europeans taking advantage of this new consciousness.

After Westphalia, notably in the Netherlands, the new courage of thinkers to question themselves and to challenge society to change became evident. The crises of 1650 and 1672 (as well, Mr. Trevor-Roper notes, as the one in 1618 -- he also notes that the Netherlands were an anomaly in this regard) were not general crises in a small area but were instead less significant political crises on top of a solid social structure.[40] "[T]he top-heavy apparatus of the State had been purged [as a result of inquiry and dissent]: society beneath was sound."[41]

Mr. Elliott's problem of unsuccessful revolts is similar to the crises in the United Provinces, in that they were not broad enough in their urgency to qualify as general crises. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the call for these specific revolts (though not, it must be noted, the call for revolts entirely) by satisfying, for the most part, all interested parties, including, in the end, the populace of Europe.[42]

Quite a bit happened to the population of Europe in the period between 1500 and 1800. Directly in the middle of this period falls the Treaty of Westphalia. It would be fallacious to assume that everything before 1648 was building in a concerted effort to the treaty, as it would also be wrong to claim that everything after that time had as its major cause the end of the Thirty Years' War. But the Treaty of Westphalia was not in any way insignificant in early modern European history. It was a result of the century and a half leading up to it, and was a definite division point in European history. Westphalia formalized what had been needed for a hundred and fifty years, and set the stage for further development of change for the next fifteen decades or so.

[1]Hobsbawm, E.J., "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, ed. Trevor Aston (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1965), 5.

[2]Hobsbawm, 5. Trevor-Roper, H.R., "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, ed. Trevor Aston (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1965), 59. Rabb, Theodore K., The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1975), 36. Elliott, John, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," in The General Crisis of the 17th Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1978), 111.

[3]Hobsbawm, 9-10.

[4]Hobsbawm, 10.

[5]Hobsbawm, 12.

[6]Hobsbawm, 12-13.

[7]For more information on these issues, read Mr. Hobsbawm's article entitled "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," one source of which is listed in footnote #1.

[8]Hobsbawm, 14.

[9]Hobsbawm, 14.

[10]Rabb, 78. See later in this paper for further discussion of this issue.

[11]Examples of this include the Hundred Years' War; see Ross, James Bruce and Mary Martin McLaughlin, The Portable Renaissance Reader, (Penguin: USA, 1977), 60. The timetable points out the end of the Hundred Years' War in 1453 and, simultaneously, the decline of two major powers (the Hanseatic League and Bruges, as well as agrarian changes.

[12]Kagan, Donald, Steven Ozment, and Frank M. Turner, The Western Heritage Volume B (Macmillan: New York, 1987), 457.

[13]Monod, Paul, lecture at Middlebury College, 15 September 1992.

[14]Friedrich, Carl J., "The Religious Motive Reaffirmed," in The Thirty Years' War: Problems of Motive, Extent, and Effect, ed. Theodore K. Rabb (D.C. Heath & Co.: Boston, 1964), 33.

[15]Rabb, 81-82.

[16]Rabb, 78.

[17]Rabb, 78.

[18]Rabb, 79.

[19]Rabb, 79.

[20]Trevor-Roper, 63.

[21]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 636-644.

[22]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 644.

[23]Rabb, 80-81.

[24]Rabb, 81.

[25]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 435.

[26]Rabb, 81.

[27]Hobsbawm, 5. Mr. Hobsbawm does not, however, explore this idea further in his paper, and instead, as described earlier in this paper, goes on to detail the future developments, after the middle of the seventeenth century.

[28]Rabb, 36.

[29]Trevor-Roper, 61.

[30]Trevor-Roper, 61-62. "[T]he Treaty of Câteau Cambrésis effectively ended France's exploits in Italy and left Spain [and the Spanish Habsburgs] supreme there." from The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, ed. Judith S. Levey and Agnes Greenhall (Avon: New York, 1983), 421.

[31]Kagan. Ozment, and Turner, 535.

[32]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 535.

[33]Trevor-Roper, 68.

[34]Monod, lecture at Middlebury College, 6 October 1992.

[35]Elliott, 112.

[36]Elliott, 112-113.

[37]Rabb, 36.

[38]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 440.

[39]Kagan, Ozment, and Turner, 459.

[40]Trevor-Roper, 88.

[41]Trevor-Roper, 88.

[42]Elliott, 130.

The Korean War and Truman's Dismissal of MacArthur: Vermont's Reaction

An academic paper submitted at Middlebury College during the 1992-1993 academic year.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Polly Darnell and the staff of the Sheldon Museum in Middlebury, Vermont for their help with the Vonda Bergman Papers, held there.

A heartfelt "Thank you!" to Erin O'Callaghan and Melissa Wechsler, who took precious time from their studies to help me transform this paper from its rough beginnings into its final form.

A final thanks and farewell to Peter Bry, for his encouragement and strength.

I. Introduction

Why would farmers care about a war half a world away? Their pride wounded, Vermonters spoke out in the 1950s against what they believed was poor policy and activity not in accordance with their wishes.

Vermont's history has not been studied extensively outside the state because of its agrarian society. Farmers are reputed to have quiet tongues when outsiders are around, and Vermont's farmers are no exception. Vermonters, in addition, are quite content to keep to themselves, and their economic and political effects on the country as a whole are not particularly large. Further, Vermont is often an exception to general nationwide trends and has been avoided by some historians for this reason.

After World War II, Vermont began growing. As it inched closer to the political and economic mainstream, an event of great historical significance occurred, challenging Vermont's pride in itself and asking a great deal from its inhabitants. This event was the Korean War. This war has been avoided by many historians because of its brevity and its chronological proximity to the much larger, longer, bloodier Second World War. The three years of American involvement in Korea were, in the long run, futile, and changed little. The 38th parallel still divides the country. The bloodshed on both sides served to place a period at the end of the sentence begun by the Second World War.

Korea represented the efforts of the American government and its citizens to solidify the views publicized after the victory in Japan; our fear of the Soviet Union as an opposing power to the United States, and an overwhelming dedication to the preservation of democracy against communist insurgence, became prominent parts of the American mindset throughout what was to become known as the Cold War. Korea added to American foreign policy the sentence "And we mean it."

Vermont's divergence from the national norm is a matter of pride in the Green Mountain State. But some things cannot be avoided. Vermont was no more independent than any other state when the first American ground troops landed in Korea on July 1, 1950. Its contribution to the war effort was required by the Selective Service Act, the price control legislation, and other federal legislation that was passed as part of the U.S. preparation for war.

Vermonters felt strongly about the war; they worried about their friends and relatives, and hoped that communism was being resisted as much as possible. The event of the war which generated the most discussion was the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur from his command on April 11, 1951. Vermonters statewide and in Washington kept quiet no longer. Opinions, accusations, and radical statements flew everywhere, more so regarding MacArthur and Truman than any other event during the war.

What, then, was Vermont's reaction to the dismissal? Can it be summarized, generalized, or otherwise simply described? Or are Vermonters too independent of each other for this to happen? How did this discussion fit into the attitudes surrounding the rest of the war?

II. The Origins of the Korean War

Following World War II, Korea had been divided in half by the 38th parallel. Japan had controlled Korea before and during the war, and the surrender terms, on September 8, 1945, gave the northern half of the peninsula to the Soviet Union and the southern half to the United States. General MacArthur, as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, was the military governor of all surrendered territories in the Pacific. Originally, the United States was officially against any government other than the American Military Government set up as an occupation regime. They did, however, permit Syngman Rhee, leader of the Korean Provincial Government (in exile during the war, and on tour in the U.S. raising support for a unified Korea), to return to his home country to lead the Korean Democratic Party. The Soviet Union was content to leave the Korean Communist Party to its own devices, under the assumption that a communist regime would arise and be a Soviet ally in eastern Asia.[1] MacArthur, the military governor of Korea, from the very beginning of the face-off in Korea between the U.S. and the communists, was on the front lines.

An agreement made at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945 created the opportunity for a democratic government to unify Korea, to replace the American Military Government. A commission composed of members of the United States and Soviet occupation staffs was set up to prepare the country for self-government. The Moscow Agreement also provided for a four-power trusteeship to govern the country until its own government could be arranged.[2]

This Joint Commission got very little done. They disagreed over which particular domestic political groups should be consulted for aid in arranging the new government. Negotiations between the United States and Soviet delegations floundered, and in November 1947 the United States Delegation to the United Nations asked for the U.N. General Assembly to consider "The Problem of the Independence of Korea."[3] The United Nations Temporary Commission, created by the General Assembly, began to discuss the questions of when, where, and how to hold democratic elections. After much debate and dissent, the elections were held in South Korea first; it was decided that the communist political atmosphere in North Korea would prevent a free election.[4]

On May 31, 1948, those elected met in Seoul and began their new government. Though they called themselves the Republic of Korea, they were all delegates elected from below the 38th parallel; elections in the north had not yet been held. Syngman Rhee was elected chairman of the assembly. The U.N. General Assembly declared that the Republic of Korea was the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula, and that it had control of as much of the peninsula as could be observed by the U.N. Commission.[5]

The Korean assembly did, on July 12, 1948, adopt the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, which defined Korea as "the Korean peninsula and its accessory islands." On August 5 the government was fully formed. On August 6 it began negotiations with the United States Military Command for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The transfer of power was complete on August 25, and the U.S. military forces completed their withdrawal on June 30, 1949.[6]

The Soviets, for their part in the disunity taking place in Korea, set up a North Korean government and largely ignored the southern election and the ROK. On May 1, 1948, the Korean People's Committee, which was to govern North Korea, had issued its constitution, and on August 25 elections were held, in which South Korea was represented by a small group of South Koreans sympathetic to the northern communists. The government set up following this election also proclaimed its sovereignty over all of Korea. It requested that Soviet troops be withdrawn by the end of 1948, a request to which the Soviet Union agreed.[7]

The U.S. National Security Agency directed in March 1949 that danger of a North Korean invasion was always extant, regardless of American military presence, and therefore should not delay the withdrawal of American troops from Korea.[8] The U.N. Commission urged that Korean reunification be negotiated before the military evacuation was complete. In its report it warned of a possible outbreak of war if the fate of Korea were left to the North and South Korean governments. This proved to be a legitimate warning. South Korea, after the evacuation, began antagonizing North Korea. It demanded that the North Korean government dissolve itself and send representatives to the Republic's Assembly. If the North Koreans did not do this voluntarily, the South Korean government claimed it was justified in using force to achieve the authority it had assigned itself.[9]

Division between North and South grew, and distrust flourished. On April 1, 1949, the southern government banned all trade with the north. It stubbornly refused to accept anything other than complete northern submission. With the completion of the United States withdrawal on June 27, 1949 (except for 500 military advisors), South Korea was militarily too weak to singlehandedly defend itself against a North Korean attack. The U.N. Commission remained in Korea reporting on circumstances which, in its opinion, might lead to armed conflict on the peninsula.[10]

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel to begin an armed conflict that lasted until the armistice on July 27, 1953. Three days after the attack, Seoul, the South Korean capital fell to communist troops. Over the year since the American withdrawal, South Korea's military condition had not improved. Three days after Seoul's capture, the first United States ground troops arrived in Korea on July 1, 1950.

III. The Initial Reactions

MacArthur was still in command of the United States forces in the Far East when hostilities began. The United Nations met the following day and resolved that the invasion was a breach of the peace and demanded that the North Koreans withdraw their forces. The United Nations called on all member nations to aid South Korea in resisting the attack.[11]

Truman voiced the country's worst fear: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." Resolutions and declarations were made in the U.N., Washington, and all over the world, and 15 different countries were fighting in Korea under the auspices of the U.N. by the beginning of 1951. Following its pattern throughout the postwar period, the U.N. followed the United States' lead, and on July 7, 1951, a British and French proposal was adopted, establishing a unified multinational command under the United States. The resolution also gave the United States the power to choose the commander of those forces. The next day Truman selected General MacArthur to head the U.N. command. At that point, MacArthur held the posts of Supreme Commander of United Nations Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Far East; Commanding General, U.S. Army, Far East; and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.[12]

As the world and nation reacted, so did Vermont. Within twenty-four hours after the attack, U.S. Senator Ralph Flanders (R-VT) addressed the Society of Friends (Quakers) Biennial Conference in Cape May, New Jersey. In a speech tailored to the developing international situation and the pacifism of his audience, Flanders expressed his belief that "[o]nly through breaking down the present barriers that prevent mutual understanding among people can we achieve [peace]."[13] The Burlington Free Press differed. In an editorial making the analogy between the North Korean aggression and the Nazism of recent memory, it demanded that "the words of our declared intentions . . . be given meaning." It wanted retribution to prevent any further aggression, and declared that the invasion of South Korea was a test of American resolve. The Free Press wanted blood and a powerful show of American military might.[14] It was to get its bloodbath. The following day the Free Press had calmed down a bit and it expressed hope that the show of strength that was underway in the skies over Korea would be enough to bring the communists to the bargaining table.[15]

Though they shared both jobs, the Rutland Daily Herald maintained a good watch on the home front, while the Free Press had its journalistic and editorial eye on Korea. Both newspapers had announcements of enlistments of Vermonters into the U.S. military, and such articles, though small, were common. On June 29, 1950, for example, the Daily Herald announced that six Vermonters had enlisted in the Air Force and the Army.[16] Even Vermont's Governor, Harold J. Arthur, got behind the war movement and announced that he would join the Vermont National Guard for its summer field training. As Governor he held the office of commander-in-chief of the National Guard, but he asked for a regular duty assignment and promised to follow orders.[17] Despite his intent to participate in military training, the Governor held out the hope that the situation would be settled without war. He did say he was "ready to serve if needed."[18]

That sort of guarded optimism was reflected by Winston L. Prouty, Vermont Republican candidate for Congress, who said that "no one could tell to what the Korean War might lead, but [until the communists give up their quest for world domination] war will remain more than a remote possibility."[19] The Rutland Daily Herald also asserted that participating in the United Nations mission in Korea was our duty in resisting the worldwide spread of communism.[20] The Free Press did try to alleviate some fears of the impending domination of communism. It added its voice to the determined air of the Daily Herald and warned of a decrease in home front morale as bad news came back from the front lines. It urged Vermonters to continue to contribute to the war effort, saying "it is our apprehensions, rather than our defenses, that we can best afford to moderate."[21]

Representative Charles A. Plumley agreed with this, but vehemently argued that we had already neglected our defenses. "We are unprepared to meet the present crisis!" he declared emphatically.[22] Senator Flanders hoped that what was to come would bring peace, but also believed that whatever the Korean conflict led to, the United States as a government and as a people should be prepared to "devote itself with all its heart and mind and strength."[23]

The worst of all fears was expressed by a candidate for the Lieutenant Governorship of Vermont: "The Korean War is the beginning of World War III."[24]

IV. The United Nations Fights Back

As the end of 1950 approached, the United Nations forces began to take back South Korea from the northern invaders. Pushed back to the southeastern corner of the peninsula, near Pusan, the U.N. forces were helpless. MacArthur wanted to launch a behind-the-lines raid to catch the North Koreans by surprise. Most top military advisers disapproved of his choice of targets: Inchon, a port on the western coast of Korea, just south of the 38th parallel. MacArthur was able to persuade his reluctant superiors to go along with his idea. He carried it out with stunning ability, totally surprising the North Koreans. They fell back from the Pusan perimeter all the way to the 38th parallel in two weeks.[25]

Many politicians wanted to limit the northern progress of U.N. forces to the 38th parallel, in keeping with the spirit of the post-World War II agreement. Others disagreed, claiming that the United Nations resolutions working toward a united Korea gave the U.N. the authority to cross the truce line. On September 27, Truman ordered MacArthur to proceed north of the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean Army, so long as he met with no Chinese or Soviet resistance. The Assembly adopted a resolution to this effect on October 7, 1950.[26]

The North Koreans did not reply, and the advance across the north-south border began. The Chinese massed troops on the Yalu River (which divides Korea from China) when the U.N. had crossed the 38th parallel. The question had arisen, as the advance approached Red China, of how serious the Chinese threats of intervention really were. It was realized in early October that Chinese troops were fighting with the North Korean troops in significant numbers. On October 24, 1950, MacArthur defied the Joint Chiefs of Staff again, more directly than he had in the Inchon debate. The Joint Chiefs had, in late September, directed MacArthur to destroy the North Korean forces but not to advance beyond the Korean border; in addition, no non-Korean forces were to be used in those areas bordering the Soviet Union or China, for fear of provoking either or both of those powers into officially joining the fray. MacArthur authorized any U.N. forces to attack North Korean-Chinese units, though he suggested that non-Korean units in border regions be replaced with Korean units as soon as possible. His explanation to the Joint Chiefs was that it was militarily necessary, and they accepted this reasoning.[27]

MacArthur's more pressing motivation was his strong distaste for China. He was forming a plan to attack and destroy it. He did not trust the Chinese, nor was he prepared to accept the Truman administration's policy of not provoking China into war. He fought the administration's restrictions, and accepted only weaker versions of them. Those policies he found too strict, he either ignored or had changed.[28] MacArthur's attitude was one of disobedience and irreverence towards his superiors. His actions show that he was unconcerned with the U.N. policies and did not limit his own objective (or that of his command) to the unification of Korea.

After much debate and negotiation with China, the U.N. position on the Yalu River was held. The U.N. forces did not engage Chinese forces which remained on the north side of the river. MacArthur expressed his intent (again in defiance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to march to the Yalu River and stay. The Joint Chiefs had ordered him specifically not to take the Yalu, but instead only to control the approaches to it. MacArthur invoked the U.N. resolutions asking for the military unification of all of Korea, and he declared his determination to follow them to the letter.[29]

Vermont was equally determined to support the war effort. Even before the Inchon landing a letter written by a retired U.S. Army colonel from Vermont expressed pleasure at the support the fighting men in Korea were receiving from home. He noted that Vermonters seemed to understand and appreciate the sacrifices made by their fellow Vermonters in the fight against communism.[30] Christmas gift mailings were being prepared in Burlington as early as October, and other gifts were constantly being sent to Vermont natives serving overseas.[31] The Burlington Free Press began printing a new section each week - "The Serviceman's Weekly." It was the previous week's news in abridged form for sending to those serving overseas to keep them in touch with their hometowns.[32]

Vermonters knew what was going on - there was a war, and their neighbors, friends, and relatives were in the middle of it. But Senator George D. Aiken (R-VT), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, did not know what was happening politically: "Not a Republican member of the Senate knows what is really going on" with the Administration policy. He wanted peace and hoped the administration was working towards that end, but was not informed enough to trust Truman with the task that had fallen to the President.[33]

Vermonters not in Washington were not about to abandon their loved ones in strange lands. They also were not going to forsake themselves at home. There was a civilian defense program growing in Vermont, preparing the state in case of an attack on the United States by communist forces. It was designed to minimize the effects of such a disaster and maintain production levels to support the resistance effort.[34] The state of readiness in Vermont was reflected in the reaction to Truman's declaration of a national state of emergency on December 16, 1950. The Rutland Daily Herald discussed this in an editorial, asking why the nation was not mobilizing faster to meet the communist threat.[35] Vermonters were disappointed that Truman's speech did not call for an all-out mobilization, though the Vermont National Guard and National Air Guard were called to active duty.[36] The general question on every Vermonter's lips was, "What are we waiting for?"[37]

The situation near the beginning of December, as the U.N. forces were falling back in the face of Chinese aggression, was such that Senator Flanders spoke on the Senate floor regarding the use of the atomic bomb in Korea.[38] He said he would support dropping atomic weapons on Korea if the U.N. General Assembly saw fit to do so. The debate arose: would the detonation of an atomic bomb save lives in the end? Flanders suggested that it might.[39]

Prouty was disappointed that politicians were making decisions about troop allocations. He felt that the military knew best where troops would be most effectively used. He also requested that U.N. members provide a larger share of the multinational force in Korea (largely United States military, with significant backing from South Korean forces).[40] This principle of American domination of the U.N. was to be MacArthur's main complaint as well - that he was not permitted to act in accordance with military requirements because of diplomatic and political constraints.[41]

V. The MacArthur-Truman Controversy

On March 24, 1951, MacArthur announced a peace plan of his own, opposing the frustratingly limiting U.N. plan. He specifically expressed disregard for "Taiwan or China's seat in the United Nations." He advocated full pursuit of the war in Korea, and predicted that this would lead to the destruction of Red China. This plan, which gave MacArthur full responsibility for fulfilling the U.N. goals in Korea, was cabled simultaneously to Washington and Peking.[42]

On April 5, a telegram from MacArthur to House Minority Leader Joseph Martin was read aloud by Martin in Congress. Martin had recently demanded that Truman launch an attack on a second front in Asia, urging that Chiang's Nationalist troops be used for this purpose. He had asked for MacArthur's reply, and he was answered strongly. MacArthur supported Martin's idea, and further expressed his unhappiness with the political slowness of the administration. He asserted that the communists were out for world domination, and that we should not be so limited in our sight as to confine the war in Asia to the Korean peninsula.[43]

MacArthur went too far. His disobedience finally offended the President. Truman recognized that MacArthur had a different goal from that of the U.N.; MacArthur wanted to invade Red China and take on the world in a war against communism. MacArthur made public his discontent with the U.N. policy, and Truman, in reply, issued an order (in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces) requiring MacArthur to keep his differences of opinion to himself. MacArthur did not comply, and voiced his dissenting opinion.[44]

On April 11, 1951, President Truman announced to the world that he had relieved General MacArthur of his command, and that General Matthew Ridgway was to succeed MacArthur. The nation was shocked and surprised; Vermont was no exception.

The Vermonters on Capitol Hill had different reactions, but they agreed on two items: first, that the opposing views of MacArthur and the Truman Administration made MacArthur's situation untenable. And second, the situation was too serious to become a partisan issue, but that it had already become one. Representative Prouty termed the dismissal "tragic," and lamented the loss of MacArthur's military expertise; he hoped that the release from duty would allow the General to express better his views on how the war should have been pursued. Senator Flanders thought MacArthur should have resigned and taken his ideas to the American people, instead of causing conflict between the Administration and the U.S. Command in the Far East. Senator Aiken questioned Truman's authority to remove from office a commander of United Nations forces, but agreed that the president did have the right to dismiss MacArthur from his posts in the United States armed forces.[45] The U.N. Security Council's resolution of July 7, 1950 gave the United States the authority to select the commander of the United Nations multinational force, so Truman had not overstepped his bounds on that charge either.[46]

Calls for Truman's impeachment flooded Washington, originating from all over Vermont and the nation. A telegram demanding Truman's impeachment gained many signatures in the Montpelier business district.[47] In the Vermont House of Representatives a representative from Putney introduced a resolution calling for Truman's impeachment "on grounds of incompetence." A representative from Londonderry called the resolution "a shocking proposal." Others felt similarly; the issue, however, was tabled by a 141-52 vote, and subsequently withdrawn from consideration.[48] A less provocative resolution expressing "regret" at MacArthur's dismissal was proposed the following week and passed the House without trouble. It was delayed in the Senate for another week, but eventually passed.[49]

Senator Aiken's office reported that he got 500 demands for Truman's impeachment for every one complaint about high prices.[50] The American public was louder about the MacArthur issue than any other during the 82nd Congress;[51] Aiken remarked that the public expression following Truman's action was louder than any in his previous 20 years of public service.[52] There were some letters of approval but "these have not equalled more than one-half of one percent."[53] In Rutland there was a great deal of criticism of Truman among the membership of both political parties. A leading Democrat, who asked to remain anonymous, said, "I am in favor of any move of impeachment."[54] Public feeling, while largely negative, was not uniform. Vermonters, in letters and telegrams to their men in Washington, described their reactions with "varying degrees of shock, bitterness, alarm and anger."[55]

The commander of the American Legion post in Rutland conceded that Truman made a militarily sound decision, but felt that it was politically a bad idea.[56] The state American Legion expressed publicly its disappointment with Truman's action, but reminded all Legionnaires that Truman was the Commander-in-Chief. The state Adjutant of the Legion worried that the move would lower morale among troops, as it had at home.[57]

Criticism and accusations flew from both sides at both Truman and MacArthur, accusing each of exacerbating the situation to the point where firing MacArthur was the only way out. Public servants were particularly outspoken. Senator Flanders saw MacArthur's job as one "no military man could successfully have carried out." Prouty felt that MacArthur's diplomatic constraints made the U.N. commander's task "unbearable to one of his character."[58] Henry Vail, the chair of the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee expected more of the President and his staff than the removal of MacArthur, but also expected that a man of MacArthur's stature and military experience would have known better than to disobey his commander-in-chief; he felt MacArthur deserved some sort of punishment for his disregard for his superiors. Vermont Lieutenant Governor Joseph Johnson regretted that the President's differences with the general had not been handled in such a way as to avoid the dismissal. The Speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives voiced the opinion of many Republicans statewide: "The President's action is consistent with his general conduct of foreign policy."[59] Without a doubt the country lost an expert in military and political policy in the Far East when MacArthur was ordered to turn over his command to Ridgway.

Two scathing letters, one on each side of the issue, were written to Vermont newspapers. The first, to the Free Press, thanked God for MacArthur's demise and likened American foreign policy in Korea (as well as the rest of the world) to the recently defeated Nazi enemy, saying "fascism by any other flag is just as rotten."[60] The second letter, to the Daily Herald, called MacArthur "a national hero" and Truman "a national zero." The writer felt that Truman's action proved the reasoning behind the choice of the jackass to symbolize the Democratic Party.[61]

Countering the accusations against Truman was the Burlington Free Press, which held MacArthur largely to blame for the incident, having taken a position forcing Truman to choose between sacking MacArthur or firing all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[62] The Rutland Daily Herald supported Truman in principle, asserting that no American would really want to do anything other than "avoid all-out war, oppose aggression, and seek world peace."[63]

Governor Emerson worried that the shakeup at Far East headquarters would induce the communists to take advantage of the controversy and step up hostilities in Korea and begin new attacks elsewhere in the world.[64] Truman's replacement of MacArthur was not a move to weaken the United Nations or the United States. Instead, it was designed to make sure all representatives of the U.N. were on the same wavelength and had the same goals. Truman could not allow his general to defy the policy defined by the U.N. General Assembly, nor could he permit the commander of the United States forces in the Far East to disobey a direct personal order. MacArthur knew what he wanted and knew what he thought. He was not going to keep his ideas quiet for the sake of international diplomacy. When freed of that restraint, he did not waste any time.

After he was replaced, he left Japan with a hero's farewell and commenced a brief tour of the United States, stopping in Hawaii, San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and, finally, Washington, where he appeared at a joint session of Congress. The general delivered a masterful speech, which swayed Representative Prouty further to MacArthur's side. Flanders and Aiken agreed, the latter comparing MacArthur's speech to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's address to a joint session of Congress at the end of World War II.[65]

In the address, MacArthur put forth his "four points of strategic policy in the Orient." First, he advocated an economic blockade of Red China. To this he added a naval blockade of the Chinese coast by the U.S. Navy, removal of restrictions on airborne reconnaissance missions over China, and the unleashing of Nationalist Chinese forces against Red China, with the aid of the United States.[66]

The Rutland Daily Herald offered a strong critique of MacArthur's speech, saying it "shed no new light" on any issues of the conflict. While a powerful orator, he "ignored or glossed over" the entire issue of the goals of the conflict. As the Daily Herald pointed out, while MacArthur did not think the Soviet Union would enter the war, he had said the same thing about China six months before. It wondered how reliable his opinion could be, given that history.[67]

Following the address, letters continued to flow rapidly into Washington. A writer asked Senator Flanders asked to devise a foreign policy which could be understood by the American people.[68] A main problem of many writers was that they did not understand the American foreign policy. This echoed Aiken's comment nearly six months before; the Administration was keeping Senate Republicans out of policy decisions.[69] Nothing had changed, and the people still did not fully understand why MacArthur had been fired.

On April 25, the Senate voted to conduct an official inquiry into the dismissal of MacArthur. It was a carefully planned joint effort between the White House and the Senate Democratic majority, designed to "give MacArthur enough rope to hang himself." The hearings began with the fervor of the nation's outrage, but did not get very far.[70]

Attitudes about the hearings differed as much as views regarding the dismissal itself. Senator Aiken was pessimistic, and expected that the hearings would not diffuse partisan tensions. Flanders, on the other hand, felt that MacArthur was making a very good showing for himself and was doing a good job of maintaining his objectivity throughout the hearings.[71] Prouty hoped both parties would drop the politicking and join together to fight the common enemy. He wanted a strong bipartisan front presented to the communists.[72]

A month later, on June 5, 1951, Flanders flip-flopped and called for the hearings to end after the current witness's testimony was finished. He said he saw no need for further investigation.[73] Aiken, too, was waffling some, saying he did not want to be part of a controversy because the general had "demonstrated ample ability to take care of himself."[74]

The issue of MacArthur had not died. The hearings were front page news, and the general himself was remembered as a hero from World War II and Korea. The focus of the public was changing, though, and with it MacArthur took a back seat. The thoughts and feelings stirred up by his dismissal did not.

VI. The Aftermath

As early as five days after the announcement that MacArthur had been relieved of command, the Burlington Free Press wondered how we would go about our strategy in Asia. It asked whether we should to limit hostilities to Korea, or whether we should risk Soviet intervention and invade China (with the help of the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-Shek). It looked to political leaders for a new direction out of the mess created by the controversy.[75]

Three days later Senator Flanders responded with a personal pledge to avert appeasement in the Far East, to discover and disclose information regarding the "Korean situation" by investigating the MacArthur dismissal, the Department of State, and the Pentagon and to support an active restraint of communism in Asia.[76]

In early July Senator Flanders proposed a basic, three-point peace plan in a speech delivered in Bellows Falls. Significantly, it combined Truman's ideas with those of MacArthur. First, Flanders proposed that an economic blockade of China continue indefinitely. Second, the U.N. (with U.S. leadership, as always) should take three years to repair Korea to its pre-war condition and then conduct elections in a united Korea. Flanders suggested establishment of a demilitarized zone between Manchuria and Korea to be supervised by the United Nations. It was a plan drawn up after Flanders met with "lower level" State Department staff.[77] At the beginning of 1951 Flanders had announced a similar plan, but one which included aiding a Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland from Chiang's base on Formosa.[78] The events of spring 1951 removed that part of the plan, and the idea of aiding or participating in an attack on China was not to resurface during the war.

Attacks on China were out. Fear of attacks on the United States were not. On February 2, 1951, field offices of the National Production Authority and Department of Commerce were opened in Vermont. These offices were to regulate the allocation of materials and to aid the Department of Defense in its troop mobilizations.[79] Five months later, the Vermont State Unemployment Commission reported that the Korean War had prevented Vermont from "what might have been a crippling economic recession," and had in fact created a business boom in Vermont.[80]

This boom created a sense of economic security, and perhaps this real confidence contributed to a false sense of security on the part of Vermonters. The Director of Civil Defense in Chester noted that her organization, and others around the state, did not have enough funds to train people properly to have a functional plan in case of emergency.[81] Civil Defense participation in the Rutland area also was at a low; just over one-tenth of the manpower needed was actually available. The Daily Herald asserted that this was a state-wide problem.[82] Four months later, in October 1952, the Burlington Free Press reported that people were still enlisting in the military as much as ever; it was the people at home who were lax in performing their patriotic duties.[83]

Flanders, a month later, just after Eisenhower's election as President, charged the President-Elect with re-examining the Korean situation. Flanders hoped that Ike would not only inspect the past decisions, but would make different ones and remove the U.S. from "the present bloody Korean War" as soon as possible.[84] In his own bid to take a new look at Korea, Prouty became the first U.S. Congressman to travel to Korea, where he met with various military leaders, Vermonters among the troops, and political leaders.[85] Upon his return, he made a speech stating his conclusions following his investigation. His evaluation did not bring up new ideas for progress, but did lament our involvement in peace talks.[86]

Prouty believed the U.N. forces could win the war, but also that we would be subject to more restrictions than we had before peace talks started. To Prouty, taking part in the peace talks was "one of our greatest blunders;" the cease-fire facilitated enemy reinforcement and resupply. He agreed with MacArthur's assessment of Russian involvement, claiming "what we do in Korea will have no effect on Russia." And U.N. military strength was up to the task of meeting any resistance, according to Prouty. Front line morale was good, and the rotation of troops back to rear areas for rest and time away from the front was working to further improve the troops' mental condition. Korean troops were proceeding well in their training, and the U.N. program preparing them for combat was going to be upgraded further. Prouty warned of the danger of insufficient ammunition reserves, stating that reserves were not then low, but that special attention was needed to maintain them at current or higher levels.[87]

This guarded optimism was reflected in reactions to Ike's first State of the Union speech in February 1953. Prouty was pleased to report that "we are beginning to take the initiative" against Communists worldwide and particularly in Korea.[88] The new administration went bravely ahead with peace talks (despite Prouty's earlier criticism) and by April 1953 negotiations were resumed. The first issue was that of prisoner of war exchanges.[89]

The Burlington Free Press discussed this issue on the eve of resumption of full-scale talks, as POWs were being repatriated daily. It expressed gratitude for the sacrifices of servicemen who had been imprisoned by the North Koreans and Chinese forces. However, the Free Press echoed the nation's wartime propagandist practices and sharply contrasted the sufferings of American soldiers with the non-human characteristics of their captors, "those who have no regard for human values."[90] This refusal to view our communist opponents as people, much less as equals, was echoed by MacArthur's continued insistence that we attack China.

On April 25, 1953, the day full-scale negotiations recommenced, MacArthur predicted that all of the U.N.'s global efforts against communism, including Korea, could be finished by threatening to bomb Chinese bases and supply lines if they did not accede to U.N. demands at the bargaining table. Eisenhower ignored his former comrade-in-arms and issued no statement in reply to MacArthur's.[91] Ike probably preferred to let MacArthur run out of steam on his own. However, MacArthur's point did have its merits.

Constantine Brown, an opinion columnist for the Free Press, wanted to pressure the communists into actually making peace. She criticized the U.N. negotiators for appeasing the Reds and prolonging peace talks. She, like MacArthur, did not trust the communists, and wanted to put some force behind new pressure for an agreement at the negotiations.[92]

Senator Flanders met with the President, to discuss his own plan for peace in Korea with Ike. He solved the problem of unifying Korea without U.S. forces near China by proposing a neutral zone in the region of the Yalu River, occupied by the armies of Asian countries (mostly South Korea). In addition, he suggested that the U.N. aid the Koreans in rebuilding their war-torn economy, housing, and road network. His third point was more of a reminder to Eisenhower of the original reason the U.S. was involved in Korea: Flanders supported nationwide free elections to choose a government for the peninsula as a whole. Flanders, after the meeting, said he was encouraged by the President's reaction to the proposals.[93]

Only a month later, Flanders criticized the President's policy with regard to the peace talks, and specifically the communist-appeasing POW exchange agreement which had just been signed. Prouty defended Eisenhower, saying the President was taking "the only possible course under the circumstances." Senator Aiken remained optimistic but wary of what would follow a truce agreement.[94] This was not an unfounded concern; Secretary of Defense Wilson predicted that six months would pass between the signing of a truce (to cease hostilities while a full peace was being negotiated) and any significant repatriation of U.S. troops from Korea.[95]

The Free Press also wondered about the terms of the settlement being worked on. It noticed that the South Koreans had objected to the POW agreement of June 8, 1953, and that they had subsequently acted drastically (releasing many POWs to freedom, rather than exchanging them with the communists) to voice their discontent. The Free Press hoped that the agreements reached at the peace talks would not "be at the expense of the people" of South Korea. It asked if the U.S. could afford the blow to our international dignity that would follow the selling out of an ally.[96]

When the U.S. showed its sincerity in its relations with South Korea by signing a mutual aid agreement, Flanders reacted strongly, proclaiming, "we foozled the Korean settlement." He was afraid of the costs to the U.S., economically and militarily.[97] This was explained by Constantine Brown the following day: the U.S. position at the negotiating table was made tougher by our history of supporting the Koreans. Our goals were not entirely practical; we had taken on the role of protecting the world from the expanse of communism, and that increased our obligation to South Korea. We could not just leave the conflict behind and get out of the bad situation. We were stuck there, forced by our own policy to put up with our obligations to protect as much of the world (and of Korea) as we could from communism.[98]

So the U.S. stayed. On July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed, which stopped fighting between U.N. forces and communist-backed troops. This was not as happy an occasion as it could have been, mainly because it left a lot of questions unanswered. It was not a peace agreement; it was a truce, to be in effect until a peace settlement could be reached. The Rutland Daily Herald expressed the general Vermont opinion: "There is little elation and no particular desire to celebrate . . . largely because of the sobering knowledge that tension continues." It put further responsibility on the shoulders of the negotiators, reminding them that the only remaining "field of contest" was in the political arena; the combat aspect had been eliminated by the truce.[99]

Governor Emerson, regretting that we hadn't followed MacArthur's suggestions, "fervently hope[d]" that the truce would lead to world peace. His two main concerns regarding the truce were whether the communists were trustworthy enough to honor the agreement, and if the U.S. (and the U.N.) would be able to negotiate an agreement for the unification of Korea. He warned that the U.S. should not relax vigilance against communism and further aggression in Korea, and should remain "prepared for any future eventuality."[100]

A poll of Lions and Rotary Club members in Burlington was conducted the day of the armistice, to gauge their reactions to the Korean War. Nearly seventy percent of them saw no gains to the U.S., or to the worldwide quest for peace, arising from the Korean War. Only one-third considered long-term peace in Korea probable, while two-thirds thought little would come of the armistice, but accepted that it was a lesser evil than continuing combat. One man did say, "We should have gone on [all the way to the Yalu River] and licked 'em good."[101]

VII. Conclusion

Vermont's reaction to MacArthur's dismissal and the Korean War in general cannot be expressed simply. There was a generally negative atmosphere in Vermont regarding the war after MacArthur's dismissal, one which had been quieter, if present, before April 1951. The Truman-MacArthur controversy led to increased public expression about the war in general. Before Ridgway replaced MacArthur, the public had been supporting the war, not complaining about it or its conduct. Vermonters were concerned with the well-being of their friends and relatives serving in Korea; they were not doubting that the U.S. military was over there for a good reason.

Then, in April 1951, they saw a war hero from World War II and a longtime fixture in the American military scene fall from glory. Popular faith in Truman and the U.S. policy regarding the war tumbled. Suddenly, people were talking and writing, expressing their outrage at such an unexpected incident. They were no longer happy with the way the war was being pursued; before, when MacArthur was running the show, they trusted him. Truman, by firing him, made a strong declaration that he did not trust MacArthur. This cost him the trust of the people, especially in Republican Vermont. As Republican national leaders lambasted Truman, so did Vermonters in public life.

This massive increase in dissent and public expression led to further criticism of the war effort, and, ironically, the plan for peace. In general, people were not happy with the Truman administration and U.S. foreign policy. It took a large blow to Vermonters' sense of national identity to get them to expand their stereotypically small worldview, but they did speak out.

MacArthur had been their hero, and his fall took Truman's popularity and support for the Korean War with him. Vermonters were part of this national trend, and their letters, speeches, and newspapers show their deep concern for an issue so close to their ties with the nation as a whole.

Works Cited

Primary

"26 Are Taking Pre-Induction Physical Exams." Burlington Free Press, 9 October 1952, 11.

"Aiken, Prouty, and Flanders Hail Address." Rutland Daily Herald, 20 April 1951, 1.

"Aiken Says People More Aroused Over M'Arthur Than High Prices." Rutland Daily Herald, 23 April 1951, 1.

"Armistice in Korea." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 28 July 1953, 8.

"Arthur to Be in Camp." Rutland Daily Herald, 30 June 1950, 13.

Bergman, Vonda. "Varied Reaction Among Vermont Congress Members." Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1951, 1.

"Bombs Could Fall on Vermont, Barre Rotary Club Told." Burlington Free Press, 15 December 1950, 3.

Brown, Constantine. "Suspicious of Chinese." Opinion column, Burlington Free Press, 25 April 1953, 6.

Brown, Constantine. "Our Indecision Over Korea." Opinion column, Burlington Free Press, 10 July 1953, 6.

"Club Members Label War in Korea As a Failure." Burlington Free Press, 28 July 1953, 9.

Congress. Senate. Senator Aiken of Vermont speaking on the MacArthur hearings. 82nd Congress. 1st Session, Congressional Record (24 May 1951), vol. 97, pt. 4, 5778.

E. A. W. Letter to the editor, Rutland Daily Herald, 14 April 1951, 8.

"Facing the Emergency." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 18 December 1950, 8.

"For Service Men." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 19 October 1950, 6.

"Gov. Arthur Says He's Ready In Comment on Korean Situation." Rutland Daily Herald, 30 June 1950, 4.

"Governor 'Fervently Hopes' Truce Will Lead to Lasting World Peace." Burlington Free Press, 28 July 1953, 9.

"Governor Says Act by Truman Untimely." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 6.

"Ike and Advisors Send Instructions for Reply to Reds." Burlington Free Press, 9 July 1953, 1.

"Joint Impeachment Resolution Offered." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1,3.

"Korea is Beginning of World War III, Asserts Wakefield." Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 2.

"Korean Test." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 27 June 1950, 6.

"Korean War Saved Vermont From Economic Recession, Report Says." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 July 1951, 5.

"Legion Critical." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 6.

"MacArthur Controversy." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 16 April 1951, 6.

"MacArthur Report." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 20 April 1951, 8.

"MacArthur's Removal." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 8.

"Many Rutland Democrats Line Up With Republicans in Vehemently Protesting Ousting of MacArthur." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1.

McCarty, Vergil. Letter to the editor, Burlington Free Press, 13 April 1951, 6.

"Montpelier Calls For Impeachment of Pres. Truman." Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1950, 9.

"Planes Over Korea." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 28 June 1950, 6.

"Plumley Says Johnson Sleeping at Switch on Korean Situation." Burlington Free Press, 3 July 1950, 2.

"Prisoners of War - Past, Present, Future." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 24 April 1953, 6.

"Prouty Would Let Military Place Troops." Rutland Daily Herald, 16 March 1951, 1, 2.

"Release of Prisoners Raises Questions." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 20 June 1953, 6.

"Sees Mutual Understanding Only Peace Hope." Rutland Daily Herald, 26 June 1950, 3.

Selleck, C.A., Col., USA-Ret. Letter to the editor, Rutland Daily Herald, 13 September 1950, 8.

"Sen. Flanders Says US Had to Accept Red Challenge or Throw UN Overboard." Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 8.

"Senate Adopts Go Slow Policy on MacA." Rutland Daily Herald, 18 April 1951, 5.

"Six Enlist for Duty With U.S. Armed Units." Rutland Daily Herald, 29 June 1950, 7.

"Symbol or Showdown?" Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 3 July 1950, 6.

"Test in Korea." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 1 July 1950, 8.

"The MacArthur Affair." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1951, 6.

"The Serviceman's Weekly." Burlington Free Press, 21 October 1950, 3.

"Truce Will Not Necessarily Mean Peace." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 16 June 1953, 6.

"Truman's Policy." Editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 13 April 1951, 8.

United Nations. Security Council. Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950. 1950.

"Vermonters in Congress Regret Ouster." Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1,3.

Vonda Bergman Papers. Sheldon Museum. Middlebury, Vermont.

"War is Probable As Long As Reds Seek World Power." Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 8.

"Wave Big Stick to End Conflict, Says MacArthur." Burlington Free Press, 25 April 1953, 1.

"Welcome to MacArthur." Editorial, Burlington Free Press, 20 April 1951, 6.

Secondary

Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.

Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War, an annotated bibliography New York: Garland Publishers, 1986.

Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.

[1]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 7-12.

[2]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 16-17.

[3]William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), 6-7.

[4]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 20.

[5]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 20-21.

[6]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 62-64.;Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 23.

[7]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 64.

[8]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 23.

[9]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 74.

[10]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 76-79.

[11]Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), xiii.

[12]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 108-121.

[13]"Sees Mutual Understanding Only Peace Hope," Rutland Daily Herald, 26 June 1950, 3.

[14]"Korean Test," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 27 June 1950, 6.

[15]"Planes Over Korea," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 28 June 1950, 6.

[16]"Six Enlist for Duty With U.S. Armed Units," Rutland Daily Herald, 29 June 1950, 7.

[17]"Arthur to Be in Camp," Rutland Daily Herald, 30 June 1950, 13.

[18]"Gov. Arthur Says He's Ready In Comment on Korean Situation," Rutland Daily Herald, 30 June 1950, 4.

[19]"War is Probable As Long As Reds Seek World Power," Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 8.

[20]"Test in Korea," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 1 July 1950, 8.

[21]"Symbol or Showdown?" editorial Burlington Free Press, 3 July 1950, 6.

[22]"Plumley Says Johnson Sleeping at Switch on Korean Situation," Burlington Free Press, 3 July 1950, 2.

[23]"Sen. Flanders Says US Had to Accept Red Challenge or Throw UN Overboard," Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 8.

[24]"Korea is Beginning of World War III, Asserts Wakefield," Burlington Free Press, 5 July 1950, 2.

[25]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 78-82.

[26]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 84-86.

[27]Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 134-141.

[28]Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 232-233.

[29]Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 95-97.

[30]C.A. Selleck, Col., USA-Ret., letter to the editor, Rutland Daily Herald, 13 September 1950, 8.

[31]"For Service Men,"editorial, Burlington Free Press, 19 October 1950, 6.

[32]"The Serviceman's Weekly," Burlington Free Press, 21 October 1950, 3.

[33]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 2.

[34]"Bombs Could Fall on Vermont, Barre Rotary Club Told," Burlington Free Press, 15 December 1950, 3.

[35]"Facing the Emergency," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 18 December 1950, 8.

[36]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 2.

[37]"Facing the Emergency," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 18 December 1950, 8.

[38]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 2.

[39]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 2.

[40]"Prouty Would Let Military Place Troops," Rutland Daily Herald, 16 March 1951, 1, 2.

[41]Vonda Bergman, "Varied Reaction Among Vermont Congress Members," Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1951, 1.

[42]Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 232-233.

[43]Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 234-235.

[44]"MacArthur's Removal," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 8.

[45]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[46]United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, 1950.

[47]"Montpelier Calls For Impeachment of Pres. Truman," Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1950, 9.

[48]"Joint Impeachment Resolution Offered," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1,3.

[49]"Senate Adopts Go Slow Policy on MacA," Rutland Daily Herald, 18 April 1951, 5.

[50]"Aiken Says People More Aroused Over M'Arthur Than High Prices," Rutland Daily Herald, 23 April 1951, 1.

[51]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[52]"Aiken Says People More Aroused Over M'Arthur Than High Prices," Rutland Daily Herald, 23 April 1951, 1.

[53]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[54]"Many Rutland Democrats Line Up With Republicans in Vehemently Protesting Ousting of MacArthur," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1.

[55]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[56]"Many Rutland Democrats Line Up With Republicans in Vehemently Protesting Ousting of MacArthur," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1.

[57]"Legion Critical," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 6.

[58]"Vermonters in Congress Regret Ouster," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 1,3.

[59]"Governor Says Act by Truman Untimely," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 6.

[60]Vergil McCarty, letter to the editor, Burlington Free Press, 13 April 1951, 6.

[61]E. A. W., letter to the editor, Rutland Daily Herald, 14 April 1951, 8.

[62]"The MacArthur Affair," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 12 April 1951, 6.

[63]"Truman's Policy," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 13 April 1951, 8.

[64]"Governor Says Act by Truman Untimely," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 April 1951, 6.

[65]"Aiken, Prouty, and Flanders Hail Address," Rutland Daily Herald, 20 April 1951, 1.

[66]"Welcome to MacArthur," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 20 April 1951, 6.

[67]"MacArthur Report," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 20 April 1951, 8.

[68]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[69]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 2.

[70]Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 245-246.

[71]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[72]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[73]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[74]Congress, Senate, Senator Aiken of Vermont speaking on the MacArthur hearings, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record (24 May 1951), vol. 97, pt. 4, 5778.

[75]"MacArthur Controversy," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 16 April 1951, 6.

[76]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[77]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[78]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[79]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 3.

[80]"Korean War Saved Vermont From Economic Recession, Report Says," Rutland Daily Herald, 12 July 1951, 5.

[81]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[82]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[83]"26 Are Taking Pre-Induction Physical Exams," Burlington Free Press, 9 October 1952, 11.

[84]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[85]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[86]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[87]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 4.

[88]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 5.

[89]Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War, an annotated bibliography (New York: Garland Publishers, 1986), xxxii.

[90]"Prisoners of War - Past, Present, Future," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 24 April 1953, 6.

[91]"Wave Big Stick to End Conflict, Says MacArthur," Burlington Free Press, 25 April 1953, 1.

[92]Constantine Brown, "Suspicious of Chinese," opinion column, Burlington Free Press, 25 April 1953, 6.

[93]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 5.

[94]Vonda Bergman Papers, news clippings, Sheldon Museum, Middlebury, VT, Volume 5.

[95]"Truce Will Not Necessarily Mean Peace," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 16 June 1953, 6.

[96]"Release of Prisoners Raises Questions," editorial, Burlington Free Press, 20 June 1953, 6.

[97]"Ike and Advisors Send Instructions for Reply to Reds," Burlington Free Press, 9 July 1953, 1.

[98]Constantine Brown, "Our Indecision Over Korea," opinion column, Burlington Free Press, 10 July 1953, 6.

[99]"Armistice in Korea," editorial, Rutland Daily Herald, 28 July 1953, 8.

[100]"Governor 'Fervently Hopes' Truce Will Lead to Lasting World Peace," Burlington Free Press, 28 July 1953, 9.

[101]"Club Members Label War in Korea As a Failure," Burlington Free Press, 28 July 1953, 9.