Tuesday, July 24, 2018

Russians hacked into US electric utilities: 6 essential reads

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Who’s in control of what’s flowing in these wires? D Sharon Pruitt, CC BY
Jeff Inglis, The Conversation

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has revealed that Russian government hackers have gained deep access to hundreds of U.S. electrical utility companies, gaining far more access to the operations of many more companies than previously disclosed by federal officials.

Securing the electrical grid, upon which is built almost the entirety of modern society, is a monumental challenge. Several experts have explained aspects of the task, potential solutions and the risks of failure for The Conversation:

1. What’s at stake?

The scale of disruption would depend, in part, on how much damage the attackers wanted to do. But a major cyberattack on the electricity grid could send surges through the grid, much as solar storms have done.

Those events, explains Rochester Institute of Technology space weather scholar Roger Dube, cause power surges, damaging transmission equipment. One solar storm in March 1989, he writes, left “6 million people without power for nine hours … [and] destroyed a large transformer at a New Jersey nuclear plant. Even though a spare transformer was nearby, it still took six months to remove and replace the melted unit.”

More serious attacks, like larger solar storms, could knock out manufacturing plants that build replacement electrical equipment, gas pumps to fuel trucks to deliver the material and even “the machinery that extracts oil from the ground and refines it into usable fuel. … Even systems that seem non-technological, like public water supplies, would shut down: Their pumps and purification systems need electricity.”

In the most severe cases, with fuel-starved transportation stalled and other basic infrastructure not working, “[p]eople in developed countries would find themselves with no running water, no sewage systems, no refrigerated food, and no way to get any food or other necessities transported from far away. People in places with more basic economies would also be without needed supplies from afar.”

2. It wouldn’t be the first time

Russia has penetrated other countries’ electricity grids in the past, and used its access to do real damage. In the middle of winter 2015, for instance, a Russian cyberattack shut off the power to Ukraine’s capital in the middle of winter 2015.

Power grid scholar Michael McElfresh at Santa Clara University discusses what happened to cause hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to lose power for several hours, and notes that U.S. utilities use software similar to their Ukrainian counterparts – and therefore share the same vulnerabilities.

3. Security work is ongoing

These threats aren’t new, write grid security experts Manimaran Govindarasu from Iowa State and Adam Hahn from Washington State University. There are a lot of people planning defenses, including the U.S. government. And the “North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which oversees the grid in the U.S. and Canada, has rules … for how electric companies must protect the power grid both physically and electronically.” The group holds training exercises in which utility companies practice responding to attacks.

4. There are more vulnerabilities now

Grid researcher McElfresh also explains that the grid is increasingly complex, with with thousands of companies responsible for different aspects of generating, transmission, and delivery to customers. In addition, new technologies have led companies to incorporate more sensors and other “smart grid” technologies. He describes how that “has created many more access points for penetrating into the grid computer systems.”

5. It’s time to ramp up efforts

The depth of access and potential control over electrical systems means there has never been a better time than right now to step up grid security, writes public-utility researcher Theodore Kury at the University of Florida. He notes that many of those efforts may also help protect the grid from storm damage and other disasters.

6. A possible solution could be smaller grids

One protective effort was identified by electrical engineer Joshua Pearce at Michigan Technological University, who has studied ways to protect electricity supplies to U.S. military bases both within the country and abroad. He found that the Pentagon has already begun testing systems that combine solar-panel arrays with large-capacity batteries. “The equipment is connected together – and to buildings it serves – in what is called a ‘microgrid,’ which is normally connected to the regular commercial power grid but can be disconnected and become self-sustaining when disaster strikes.”

He found that microgrid systems could make military bases more resilient in the face of cyberattacks, criminals or terrorists and natural disasters – and even help the military “generate all of its electricity from distributed renewable sources by 2025 … which would provide energy reliability and decrease costs, [and] largely eliminate a major group of very real threats to national security.”

The ConversationEditor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.

Jeff Inglis, Science + Technology Editor, The Conversation

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Friday, July 13, 2018

Securing America's voting systems against spying and meddling: 6 essential reads

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Can they be confident their votes will count? 4zevar/Shutterstock.com
Jeff Inglis, The Conversation

The federal indictments of 12 Russian government agents accuse them of hacking computers to spy on and meddle with the U.S. 2016 presidential election – including state and county election databases.

With the 2018 midterm congressional elections approaching – along with countless state and local elections – here are highlights of The Conversation’s coverage of voting system integrity, offering ideas, lessons and cautions for officials and voters alike.

1. Voting machines are old

After the debacle of the 2000 election’s efforts to count votes, the federal government handed out massive amounts of money to the states to buy newer voting equipment that, everyone hoped, would avoid a repeat of the “hanging chad” mess. But almost two decades later, as Lawrence Norden and Christopher Famighetti at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University explain, that one-time cash infusion has left a troubling legacy of aging voting machines:

“Imagine you went to your basement and dusted off the laptop or mobile phone that you used in 2002. What would happen if you tried to turn it on?”

That’s the machinery U.S. democracy depends on.

2. Not everyone can use the devices

Most voting machines don’t make accommodations for people with physical disabilities that affect how they vote. Juan Gilbert at the University of Florida quantified the problem during the 2012 presidential election:

“The turnout rate for voters with disabilities was 5.7 percent lower than for people without disabilities. If voters with disabilities had voted at the same rate as those without a disability, there would have been three million more voters weighing in on issues of local, state and national significance.”

To date, most efforts to solve the problems have involved using special voting equipment just for people with particular disabilities. That’s expensive and inefficient – and remember, separate is not equal. Gilbert has invented an open-source (read: inexpensive) voting machine system that can be used by people with many different disabilities, as well as people without disabilities.

With the system, which has been tested and approved in several states, voters can cast their ballots using a keyboard, a joystick, physical buttons, a touchscreen or even their voice.

3. Machines are not secure

In part because of their age, nearly every voting machine in use is vulnerable to various sorts of cyberattacks. For years, researchers have documented ways to tamper with vote counts, and yet few machines have had their cyberdefenses upgraded.

The fact that the election system is so widespread – with multiple machines in every municipality nationwide – also makes it weaker, writes Richard Forno at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County: There are simply more opportunities for an attacker to find a way in.

“Voter registration and administration systems operated by state and national governments are at risk too. Hacks here could affect voter rosters and citizen databases. Failing to secure these systems and records could result in fraudulent information in the voter database that may lead to improper (or illegal) voter registrations and potentially the casting of fraudulent votes.”

4. Even without an attack, major concerns

Even if any particular election isn’t actually attacked – or if nobody can prove it was – public trust in elections is vulnerable to sore losers taking advantage of the fact that cyberweaknesses exist. Just that prospect could destabilize the country, argues Herbert Lin of Stanford University:

“State and local election officials can and should provide for paper backup of voting this (and every) November. But in the end, debunking claims of election rigging, electronically or otherwise, amounts to trying to prove something didn’t happen – it can’t be done.”

5. The Russians are a factor

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announces the indictments of 12 Russian government officials for hacking in connection with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. AP Photo/Evan Vucci

American University historian Eric Lohr explains the centuries of experience Russia has in meddling in other countries’ affairs, but notes that the U.S. isn’t innocent itself:

“In fact, the U.S. has a long record of putting its finger on the scales in elections in other countries.”

Neither country is unique: Countries have attempted to influence each other’s domestic politics throughout history.

6. Other problems aren’t technological

Other major threats to U.S. election integrity have to do with domestic policies governing how voting districts are designed, and who can vote.

Penn State technologist Sascha Meinrath discusses how partisan panels have “systematically drawn voting districts in ways that dilute the power of their opponent’s party” and “chosen to systematically disenfranchise poor, minority and overwhelmingly Democratic-leaning constituencies.”

There’s plenty of work to be done.

The ConversationEditors’ note: This is an updated version of an article originally published Oct. 18, 2016.

Jeff Inglis, Science + Technology Editor, The Conversation

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.